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A REVISED REVISIONIST POSITION
IN THE LAW OF NATIONS DEBATE
DAVID M. HOWARD*
ABSTRACT
One of the most contentious debates in the legal field has continued
for decades over the question: is customary international law
incorporated into U.S. domestic law? This question has sparked
controversy that has resulted in multiple positions but no definite
answer—the modern position with Dean Harold Koh and Professor
Carlos Vasquez to the revisionist position with Professors Curtis Bradley
and Jack Goldsmith. The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to answer this
question while acknowledging the importance of its impact on U.S. law.
The latest case before the Supreme Court—Jesner v. Arab Bank—
touched upon this debate once again, and while its decision implicitly
supports the revisionist position, the Court did not resolve this debate.
This Article posits that the revisionist position put forth by Professors
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith was ultimately correct—with a slight
revision. This Article concludes that: (1) the traditional law of nations is
exclusively within federal law, while modern CIL can be adopted by the
states; and (2) the law of nations only becomes federal law if either (a)
the Constitution permits or requires the law of nations in interpretation
of its provisions; or (b) the political branches adopt CIL or give the
judiciary jurisdiction to decide questions regarding the law of nations.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most contentious debates in the legal field today is
whether customary international law (“CIL”) or the “law of nations”1
is incorporated into the domestic law of the United States. This debate
began before the turn of the century with revisionist scholars
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith’s challenge to the long1. Customary international law as it is defined today was historically known as the “law of
nations.” While there is some debate whether customary international law is the same as the law
of nations or is different or only a part of the law of nations, for purposes of this Article, both
terms will be used interchangeably. See Jordan Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature,
Sources and Status in the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 59 (1990). Cf. William J. Moon,
The Original Meaning of the Law of Nations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 54 (2016) (arguing that the
“law of nations” at the time of the Founding and current CIL are not necessarily the same).
Compare Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “customary
international law is not synonymous with the law of nations, but rather that ‘customary
international law is one of the sources for the law of nations’”) with Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem.
Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The law of nations is synonymous with ‘customary
international law.’”).
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held position that CIL is federal law—what they termed the “modern
position.”2 While theirs was not the first article to challenge the idea
that CIL is federal law,3 it was the spark to the current debate. Since
that article, scholars have split primarily into three schools of thought:
(1) the modern position, (2) the revisionist position, and (3) the
intermediate position, although this latter position encompasses
several distinct conclusions.4
In this debate, the modern position generally holds that CIL is
incorporated into federal law. The revisionist position posits the
opposite: CIL is not federal law unless incorporated by the federal
political branches or the states. The intermediate position takes a
middle ground: that CIL has a status between state and federal law—
essentially non-preemptive federal or non-federal law. Recently,
additional articles have emerged from scholars including Gary Born,
Professor Anthony Bellia, and Professor Bradford Clark.5 Though this
debate has ensued for decades, the arguments continue today without
a prevailing answer.
This debate has not been contained to the academic field. Since
Bradley and Goldsmith’s original article, the Supreme Court has
reviewed several decisions involving CIL’s relationship to domestic
law, including Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,6 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co,7 and most recently Jesner v. Arab Bank.8 Instead of
providing answers as to CIL’s status in the United States, the Supreme
Court has only muddied the waters.9

2. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997)
[hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique] (setting forth the revisionist position).
3. See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REV. 665, 668 (1986); M. E. Kelly, Customary International Law in United States Courts,
32 VILL. L. REV. 1089, 1126 (1987).
4. See generally Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique
of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011) (discussing the intermediate positions).
5. See also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012) [hereinafter, Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law]; Gary Born,
Customary International Law in United States Courts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1641, 1671 (2017).
6. 542 U.S. 692, 699 (2004) (concluding that non-resident aliens may file a tort suit in federal
court for violations of customary international law but ultimately rejected the claim).
7. 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (looking to violations against the law of nations but rejecting
the claim because of the presumption against extraterritoriality application of the statute).
8. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018) (concluding that the Alien Tort Statute does not permit
lawsuits against foreign corporations).
9. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120
HARV. L. REV. F. 28, 28 (2007) (discussing how all sides of the law of nations debate have
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This debate can affect many areas of domestic and international
law.10 As discussed infra,11 CIL is a binding norm of international law if
it is “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from
a sense of legal obligation.”12 Essentially, if a critical number of states
conform to a certain practice and consider it legally binding, then that
practice is binding on all states.13 For example, there are few domestic
and international laws currently regulating the international realm of
cybersecurity law. U.S. law has not kept up with the pace of changing
technology or the interconnectedness of the internet.14 This is a
particularly troubling problem, as demonstrated in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election and recent cyberattacks on states and private
companies.15 There are some international rules that provide guidance,
such as the TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE.16 These rules are adopted by
experts and generally reflect CIL, including the idea that existing jus ad
bellum (“right to war”)17 and jus in bello (“law in waging war”)18 rules
apply in cyberspace.19
The question remains: in the absence of a statute or executive
action, are federal courts required to apply CIL norms in cyber-related
cases, such as in cases of cyberespionage or cyberterrorism? If the
modern position of this debate is correct, then the answer is generally:
yes, courts must apply CIL as part of federal law. If the revisionist
position controls, then no, federal courts cannot apply CIL without
interpreted the Supreme Court’s decisions through Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain as supporting their
own arguments). After the decisions in Sosa and Koibel, the number of books and articles
discussing the effect of these cases on CIL incorporation into federal law has seemed to increase.
See generally ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2017) [hereinafter BELLIA & CLARK]; CURTIS BRADLEY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM (2013); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER,
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5.
10. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9, at xi–xii.
11. See infra Part II.
12. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(2) (1987).
13. Whether this is an accurate definition of CIL is beyond the scope of this article.
14. David M. Howard, Can Democracy Survive the Cyber Age?: 1984 in the 21st Century, 69
HASTINGS L.J. 1355, 1364 (2018).
15. See, e.g., Jessica Bursztynsky, Ex-CIA officer sees Iran doing ‘hit-and-run’ cyberattacks
— ‘They don’t want us to retaliate’, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/09/ex-ciaofficial-carol-rollie-flynn-sees-iran-doing-small-cyberattacks.html.
16. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
(2d ed. 2017).
17. JUS AD BELLUM, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
18. JUS IN BELLO, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
19. Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 376 (2015); see also
Harold Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 7–8 (2012).
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prior political branch authorization.20 Without knowing which position
in this debate is prevailing, courts may choose contradictory or
incorrect applications of the law, if any, or ignore international laws or
tribunal decisions altogether. This is but one example of the potential
effect of CIL in the United States.
Another example relates to the application of the Paris Agreement.
Almost every country in the world has signed the agreement on climate
change21 except the United States.22 As almost every country in the
world has agreed to the terms in the Paris Agreement, this is a strong
indicium of international custom. As such, the Paris Agreement
appears to satisfy the dominant definition of CIL—a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.23 Even though the United States withdrew from the Paris
Agreement, would the U.S. still be bound by the terms of the
Agreement through CIL? In the modern position, the answer could be
yes. But the revisionist answer likely would be: no, not unless Congress
or the states incorporated the terms of the Paris Agreement into law.24
Another question that must be assessed is whether the body of
decisions of international courts and international tribunals, which
make up a significant part of the law of nations, become part of federal
law in the United States. For example, the International Court of Justice
determined the United States violated another nations’ rights under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In Medellin v. Texas,25
the United States refused to implement the international court’s
decision, as the Supreme Court ruled it is not obligated to follow that
20. Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 922 (2007) (“In some circumstances, the executive
branch can provide the authorization for courts to draw upon CIL in developing federal common
law.”).
21. Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, U.N., http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/
9444.php (last visited Dec. 14, 2019).
22. Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-paris-agreement.
html.
23. See Srinivas Raman, Customary International Law implications of Trump’s withdrawal
from Paris Agreement, MODERN DIPLOMACY (Nov. 17, 2017), https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2017/
11/17/customary-international-law-implications-of-trump-s-withdrawal-from-paris-agreement/
(concluding that the U.S. “will be obligated to conform to customary international law principles
emerging as the global norm from the Paris Agreement”).
24. This specific question does not solely relate to whether CIL is federal law, but also
whether Congress—or in this specific instance, the executive branch—can withdraw from or reject
the law of nations, and if it was effective enough to preclude the application of CIL norms to
domestic law.
25. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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court’s interpretation.26 The Supreme Court based its decision on the
fact that because the treaty provisions are not “self-executing,” the
international court’s decision is not binding on U.S. courts.27
The question, then, is not whether the international tribunal’s
decision is binding, but whether the United States courts would in the
future be bound by the law of nations, which is created by an
amalgamation of laws, including that ICJ decision. This argument could
find that the U.S. violated a nation’s rights under CIL, amounting to the
same result as being bound by the ICJ decision. Rather than the specific
decision being enforced in the U.S., it would be the CIL custom,
including that international tribunal’s decision, that would be enforced
under the modern position. If the customs contained in the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations becomes part of CIL, the modern
position again would say: yes, those norms are domestic law, while the
revisionist position would adamantly disagree.
While analyzing the three positions and their underlying arguments,
this Article leans in favor of the revisionist position.This position in this
Article could be termed a “revised revisionist” position because it
slightly alters the position espoused by the predominant revisionist
scholars. The questions specifically addressed here are: (1) is CIL
federal law, state law, or neither; and (2) how is CIL incorporated into
federal law—or is it at all? Based on these questions, the Article
concludes that: (1) the traditional law of nations is exclusively within
the domain of federal law, while modern CIL can be adopted by either
the federal or state political branches; and (2) the law of nations only
becomes domestic law if either (a) the Constitution permits or requires
the law of nations in interpretation of its provisions; or (b) the political
branches adopt a certain custom or give the judiciary jurisdiction to
decide questions regarding the law of nations.28
I would like to preface this Article with the statement that this is
not an article against human rights litigation or protections in the
United States. This Article simply stands for the proposition that before
courts can apply CIL, the political branches of the federal, or in some
26. Jenny S. Martinez, International Courts and the U.S. Constitution: Reexamining the
History, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2011)
27. Id.
28. This conclusion is in line with Professor Bradley and Goldsmith’s more recent article coauthored with David Moore. See Bradley et al., supra note 20, at 886 (“By contrast to the modern
position, the revisionist view was that CIL does not automatically have the status of federal
common law and that after Erie, federal courts needed some authorization from either the
political branches or the Constitution in order to apply CIL.”).
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cases, a state, government must incorporate or authorize CIL as law or
the Constitution can be interpreted to have already incorporated these
norms. While this conclusion may impact human rights litigation in the
United States, it will also make it clear that the political branches
should incorporate these norms, as the Constitution has delegated that
task to them.
This Article will review the revisionist, intermediate, and modern
positions, explaining why the revisionist position is the best resolution
of this debate. This Article will proceed in five parts: Part I will discuss
CIL overall, including the difficulty in determining what CIL entails
and its modern importance to U.S. law. Part II will then review the
current debate surrounding whether CIL is federal law, starting with
Bradley and Goldsmith’s initial challenge in 1997 to the most recent
debate involving numerous professors and international law scholars.
Part III will present a challenge to the modern and intermediate
positions and then lay out the argument for the conclusion described in
the previous paragraphs. Finally, the last part will conclude the Article.
I. DEFINING CIL AND ITS RELATION TO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The “law of nations,” or customary international law (“CIL”), is
one of the two main sources of international law—the other source is
treaties.29 CIL is considered a binding norm of international law if it is
“a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.”30 It includes only those standards, rules, or
customs (1) affecting the relationship between states or between an
individual and a foreign state, and (2) used by those states for their
common good and dealings with other states.31 CIL is distinguished
from the other main source of international law—treaties—in that
treaties are written, negotiated, and stable once signed, while CIL is
29. Nikki C. Gutierrez & Mitu Gulati, Custom in Our Courts: Reconciling Theory with
Reality in the Debate About Erie Railroad and Customary International Law, 27 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 243, 246 (2017).
30. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(2) (1987). Emmerich de Vattel
defined the law of nations as “[c]ertain maxims and customs, consecrated by long use, and
observed by nations in their mutual intercourse with each other.” EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS § 25 (Joseph Chitty ed., Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1859) (1758); see also
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) (“CIL is typically defined as the collection of international behavioral
regularities that nations over time come to view as binding as a matter of law.”).
31. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S.
108, 114 (2013).
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generally unwritten and fluid in content and interpretation.32
Customary international law is therefore best described as “a kind of
international common law.”33
CIL historically governed areas of international law such as
banning genocide, murder, and slavery, but in the past seventy years
CIL has grown to cover numerous other human rights issues as well.34
The expanding importance of CIL can be seen in the increasing number
of domestic federal cases analyzing and applying CIL, either in the
absence of federal law or in construing federal statutes.35 As our world
becomes more international and interdependent, the breadth and
importance of CIL grows.
But how does a court or state know when CIL is sufficiently created
or accepted? There are two parts to the definition of CIL: (1) a general
and consistent practice of states, and (2) that practice is followed by
states from a sense of legal obligation.36 CIL does not need to be
uniformly or unanimously applied or agreed upon for it to be
considered a general and consistent practice.37 But it is difficult to
determine what consistent state practice actually is; there is no single
source, giving CIL a soft and “indeterminate character.”38 CIL is

32. Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93
IOWA L. REV. 65, 76 (2007).
33. See Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The 1996
Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 382
(2001) (noting that “the law of nations constituted something like an international common law”).
34. Berta E. Hernandez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an International
Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 309, 356 (1991); Edward H. Sadtler, A Right to Same-Sex
Marriage Under International Law: Can It Be Vindicated in the United States?, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
405, 446 (1999).
35. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004) (concluding that non-resident
aliens may file a tort suit in federal court for violations of customary international law); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (holding that the act of state doctrine
precluded U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of the public acts that a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court has jurisdiction over a torture claim
brought by Nigerian émigrés against an American corporation for actions that occurred in
Nigeria); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that official torture
violates the law of nations and that federal courts thus have jurisdiction to hear an action in tort
by torture victims under the ATS).
36. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1075–76 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
This second element is often termed “opinio juris.” Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757,
757 (2001).
37. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of
the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 63 (1990).
38. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Louis Henkin,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995)).
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created from myriad decisions and made in hundreds of international
and domestic sources of law.Trouble particularly stems from the second
element—a sense of legal obligation—as states generally do not
explain why they take or refrain from taking particular actions.
Therefore, this opinio juris element has most often been inferred from
state practice,39 which in effect melds the two elements into one and the
same: general state practice.
Then what counts as “state practice”? Is it simply domestic case law,
or does state practice consider the opinions of that state’s government
and other indicia of a state’s actions? How does state practice become
“general and consistent,” and what is the minimum criteria? To the
traditional view, state practice is a practice of sufficient density, and the
degree of consistency required may depend on the subject matter of the
rule in question: “Rigorous conformity is not demanded for the
establishment of a rule of customary international law.”40 This state
practice comes from a combination of international court decisions,
actions and declarations from states, and other sources; together, they
create the law of nations.41 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the
law of nations as “a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”42
This requires that an international law norm have at least as much
“definite content and acceptance among civilized nations [as] the
historical paradigms familiar” at the time the Alien Tort Claim Act was
enacted.43 Similarly, the ICJ has said that “State practice . . . should have
been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
invoked.”44
An issue at the heart of CIL is whether domestic courts or their
governments drive the creation of and change in CIL. As the consistent
or general practice of states changes, so does CIL, and CIL is
“continually evolving.”45 The sources that create and alter CIL tend to
be domestic courts themselves rather than solely international
tribunals, but international decisions and agencies still influence the
39. Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 365, 373 (2002).
40. David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere”
State Practice or Customary International Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 771, 793 (1999).
41. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 247 (“Customary international law is discerned from myriad
decisions made in numerous and varied international and domestic arenas.”).
42. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
43. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719.
44. The North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Judgment), 1969 I.C.J. 12, 43.
45. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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evolution of CIL, as both indicate “general state practice.”46 A state
acting in direct violation of general CIL could instead be interpreted as
a change in the rule or evidence the beginning of a differing or new
rule, just as a court reading a CIL rule too broadly or narrowly may
actually influence or alter that rule.47 Because it is “state practice” that
defines the law of nations, the states themselves have the power to
define CIL. Historically, only a limited number of states truly created
or affected the law of nations, namely large powers or those dominant
in the area of the relevant law of nations—such as Russia and the
United States in the international law of war.48 However, as
globalization has increased, it has become more difficult for a few
powerful states to control or create CIL, requiring a more general
consensus outside the traditional powers.49
The second part of the CIL definition is that states follow this from
a “sense of legal obligation.”50 But what makes states comply with
international law? One persuasive theory is that, rather than a check
on state actions, international law instead arises from states’ pursuits of
their own self-interests.51 This theory explains that the law of nations as
CIL comes directly from state practice and changes as state practice
does. For example, virtually all states condemn torture, yet many are
still accused of continuing the practice despite that the act of torture is
a violation of the law of nations.52 If a state acts against customary

46. See Christiana Ochoa, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International Law: Identifying
and Defining CIL Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 123 (2005) (“National
courts and the international courts and tribunals referred to by McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen,
as well as mechanisms like the ATCA, provide avenues through which individuals might have
direct participation in the CIL formation process.”).
47. Cohen, supra note 32, at 77.
48. See John J. Chung, The Role of Naval Power in the Development of Customary
International Law, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 39, 43 (2015) (stating that military power exercised by
only a few states shaped the customary law of war).
49. B. S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1, 28 (2018).
50. While in practice these two elements can often be conflated, courts still look to both
elements in determining CIL norms. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248
(2d Cir. 2003) (“Furthermore, a principle is only incorporated into customary international law if
States accede to it out of a sense of legal obligation.”).
51. JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2016).
52. See also Heather L. Williams, Does an Individual Government Official Qualify for
Immunity Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?: A Human Rights-Based Approach to
Resolving A Problematic Circuit Split, 69 MD. L. REV. 587, 620 (2010) (noting that “despite
international condemnation, many of the world’s governments continue to engage in, condone,
or tolerate torture”); Rick Noack, Most countries are against torture — but most have also been
accused of it, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2014/12/12/most-countries-are-against-torture-but-most-have-also-been-accused-of-it/.
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international law, does this mean the state rejected it or changed it? Or
if they say they prohibit an act but continue to perform that same act,
does the state practice or opinio juris control? A state’s interpretation,
incorporation, or rejection of CIL norms in domestic decisions can
further solidify or alter that CIL norm. Violation of a norm that is not
fully crystallized or that does not enjoy unanimous approval may just
be the beginning of a new evolution or disintegration for that specific
custom. CIL emerges from states based on their own projected interests
rather than as a check on their power.53
Over the past two centuries, states have undergone several changes
to their structures, from the industrial state-nation, to the nation-state,
finally becoming today what has been termed a “market state.”54 Many
actions previously taken only by nations are now increasingly
controlled by non-state actors, and these non-state actors have the
ability to influence nations and harm or kill military personnel and
civilians, effectively violating the law of nations.55 Because of the
prevalence and unregulated nature of non-state actors in the
international realm, the law of nations becomes paramount.
In addition to the changes in international actors, international
actions have undergone fundamental changes. Taking a page or two
from Justice Stephen Breyer, international (or state-state) relations
have moved from purely interstate to include purely intrastate
actions.56 When the Constitution was being written, the law of nations
solely pertained to interactions between nations.57 Today, much of
international law is intimately concerned with intrastate actions,
including human rights protections and state violations of those rights.58
53. For a complete discussion of this issue, see generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note
51 (discussing how CIL is based on states’ interest rather than limits on their powers).
54. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE GARMENTS OF COURT AND PALACE: MACHIAVELLI AND THE
WORLD THAT HE MADE 169–175 (2013).
55. Shana Reeves, What Happens When States No Longer Govern?, LAWFARE (Feb. 9,
2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-happens-when-states-no-longer-govern; see also Eric
Boylan, Applying the Law of Proportionality to Cyber Conflict: Suggestions for Practitioners, 50
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 225 (2017) (stating a “real possibility that non-state actors may be
common players in the realm of cyber warfare”); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp.
2d 569, 584 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“Indeed, Sosa explicitly acknowledges the existence of a developing
consensus that non-state actors may violate certain norms as defined by the law of nations.”).
56. STEPHEN BREYER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE COURTS 167–170 (2016).
57. Id.
58. Ashley S. Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International Law,
102 VA. L. REV. 599, 629–30 (2016) (“Professor Theodor Meron has described the various ways
in which international law has shifted its focus away from state-state relations and toward the
protection of the individual in areas as diverse as investment, the environment, war-fighting, and
intellectual property. Humanization reflects that international law plays an important role in
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Actions such as genocide have long been prohibited by the law of
nations, and this invariably includes any acts of genocide that a country
inflicts on its own citizens, a completely intrastate action with
international implications.59 Because of the growing concern by nations
in the modern era, some “offenses that may be purely intra-national in
their execution, such as official torture, extrajudicial killings, and
genocide, do violate customary international law because the ‘nations
of the world’ have demonstrated that such wrongs are of ‘mutual . . .
concern,’ and capable of impairing international peace and security.”60
At the Founding, the Framers viewed the law of nations as arising
from positive or natural law,61 yet this is no longer the case. The law of
state-state relations was quite clearly the most important of the three
original categories of the law of nations, as it governed the relations
between sovereign nations.62 This law of state-state relations created a
system that nations followed to keep the peace and promote economic
connections, and is referenced and incorporated in several
constitutional provisions, such as the recognition power.63 However,
customary international law has changed drastically since the
Founding.64 Fundamental technological, social, and geopolitical change
can accelerate the formation of CIL65 in what Professor Michael Scharf

ensuring that states respect the integrity of the individual and in protecting him from excessive
governmental control.”).
59. F. Giba-Matthews, O.F.M., Customary International Law Acts As Federal Common Law
in U.S. Courts, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1839, 1841 (1997) (“Prior to the founding of the United
Nations, customary international law prohibiting such acts as torture, genocide, and slavery, was
a part of the law of nations.”).
60. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2003).
61. See Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law As U.S. Law: A Critique of the
Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and A Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1495, 1571 (2011) (stating that “in the Founders’ view, much of the law of nations was not
‘made’ at all, but instead had its basis in natural law or right reason”).
62. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9, at 139.
63. See id. at 32 n.143 (noting that the recognition power within the U.S. Constitution permits
the federal government to recognize a foreign state or government)
64. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1188 (2007); see also BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9, at 5 n.4 (citing David
L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, & William S. Dodge, Continuity and Change over Two Centuries,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 589 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey,
and William S. Dodge eds., 2011) (“Although different doctrinal changes occurred at different
times, there are few aspects of the Supreme Court’s international law doctrine that remain the
same in the twenty-first century as they were 200 years ago.”)).
65. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (describing this change).
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calls Grotian moments,66 or international constitutional moments.67
These are large turning points in the law of nations. The law of nations
is not stagnant, and each state action—to varying degrees—affects that
“general and consistent” state practice on which CIL is defined.
Because CIL is an unwritten body of law and continues to change, there
is tremendous difficulty in determining what it requires. There is even
debate over what evidence should be used to define CIL.68 This is why
“determinations of the content of customary international law
implicate not only legal considerations but also considerations of U.S.
foreign policy.”69
One such change is this emergence of “modern” CIL, which
contrasts with the law of nations during the eighteenth century because
it treats many internal state affairs as matters of international
concern,70 such as seeking to regulate how a state treats its citizens
within their own territory.71 This contrasts with the original law of
nations at the Founding: the (1) law merchant; (2) law of state-state
relations; and (3) law maritime.72 The modern law of nations has been
central to the debate about whether the law of nations is U.S. law,
because it specifically regulates internal functions of the state rather
than interactions between states.

66. “Grotian Moment” is a term used to describe a “paradigm-shifting development in which
new rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with unusual rapidity and
acceptance.” See Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of
Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 440
(2010).
67. An international constitutional moment “occurs when a rising political movement
succeeds in placing a new problematic at the center of [international] political life.” See William
Burke-White & Anne-Marie Slaughter, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (2002) (citing Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519,
1519 (1997)).
68. Curtis Bradley, The Supreme Court as a Filter Between International Law and American
Constitutionalism, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1568 (2016).
69. Id.
70. Note: The Offences Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2378, 2381
(2005).
71. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 822; BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9, at
139; Young, supra note 39, 369.
72. See John T. Parry, International Law in State Courts: Sovereignty, Resistance, Contagion,
and Inevitability, 20 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 62 (2012) (“By the time of the
American Revolution, English jurisprudence recognized three components of international law:
the law of state-state relations, the law merchant, and maritime law.”).
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II. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER THE STATUS OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Since the creation of the U.S. Constitution, both courts and scholars
have agreed that the “law of nations is a part of the law of the United
States.”73 Even so, the debate over the status of the law of nations is
contentious and ongoing.74 Much of the debate surrounds the effect of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,75
which rejected the existence of federal general common law. The
modern position, the revisionist position, and the intermediate position
generally agree that prior to the decision in Erie, the law of nations was
incorporated into U.S. law as general common law.76 It is the status of
the law of nations after Erie that divides these scholars.77
As Justice Breyer describes: “[t]he world has changed so fast that
even the usefulness and persuasiveness of formerly absolute factual
distinctions . . . can no longer be taken as a given.”78 So too has CIL and
federal law changed. Before diving into defending the position
expressed in this Article, this Part will describe each position currently
defining the debate.
A. The Modern Position
At its core, the “modern position” concludes that CIL is
incorporated as binding federal law.79 The modern position, as broadly
73. United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. 297, 299 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793); see also Jordan J. Paust,
Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 301, 301–04 (1999) (arguing that CIL has been the law of the land since the Founding).
74. See generally Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution’s Text and Customary International
Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 1747 (2018) (discussing the modern and intermediate positions); William S.
Dodge, Customary International Law, Change, and the Constitution, 102 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018)
(discussing the positions in the law of nations debate); Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary
International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a
Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011) (arguing for the modern
position); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002)
(discussing the revisionist position); Harold Honju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (arguing for the modern position); Beth Stephens, The Law of
Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393
(1997) (discussing the modern position).
75. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
76. See, e.g., Young, supra note 39, at 374 (concluding that prior to Erie, CIL was
incorporated as federal general common law; Born, supra note 5, at 1670 (same).
77. Bellia & Clark do not necessarily focus on Erie and instead focus on the interaction
between constitutional allocation of powers and CIL.
78. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 84–85 (2016).
79. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111 cmt. d (1987) (“Customary
international law is considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is federal law.
A determination of international law by the Supreme Court is binding on the States and on State
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defined by Bradley and Goldsmith, is the “proposition that customary
international law (CIL) is part of this country’s post-Erie federal
common law.”80 The primary scholars in this school of thought include
Dean Harold Koh, Gerald Neuman,81 Louis Henkin,82 Carlos Vasquez,
Beth Stephens, William Dodge, and Jordan J. Paust.83 While these
scholars’ arguments are not identical, their assertions and conclusions
are similar enough to embody the modern position.
Professor Beth Stephens has argued in favor of the modern
position, concluding that CIL is federal law and “that the
determination of the content of CIL and whether it applies in a given
situation is a federal question, which triggers federal court jurisdiction
and on which federal court decisions are binding on the states.”84
Similarly, Dean Harold Koh has argued directly against the revisionist
position of Bradley and Goldsmith, concluding that the “the hornbook
rule [is that] international law, as applied in the United States, must be
federal law.”85
The modern position argues that even though Erie denied the
existence of federal general common law, the Constitution gives the
federal government sole jurisdiction and power over international
relations and law. Because subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
affirmed the federal government’s power over international law,
modern position scholars argue that, therefore, CIL must be federal
law.86 Furthermore, modernists specifically reject the revisionist
position that CIL can be adopted as state law, as states are excluded
from enacting or participating in making international law; this is
exclusively the power of the federal government.87
courts.”).
80. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 816.
81. See Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371–72 (1997)
(discussing the modern position).
82. Louis Henkin, International Law As Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1569 (1984); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 869 (1987) (“Arguably, the fact that
treaties are subject to constitutional limitations does not conclude the issue with respect to
customary law. Customary law is general law binding on all nations, and no country should be
able to derogate from it because of that country’s particular constitutional dispositions.”).
83. This list of scholars is non-exhaustive but include the scholars whose works this Article
is largely based upon.
84. Stephens, supra note 74, at 397.
85. Koh, supra note 74, at 1825.
86. Stephens, supra note 74, at 444.
87. Koh, supra note 74, at 1838 (“With certain exceptions, placing all international law on a
federal, subconstitutional plane gives customary international law a lexical comparability with
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The modern position further argues that CIL is not only federal law
but is also binding on federal and state courts. Because the law of
nations is federal common law—rather than federal general common
law as rejected in Erie—CIL is not only federal law but is self-executing
without the need for congressional authorization.88 In contrast,
revisionist scholars have argued that Erie does affect the status of CIL.
This is because, they argue, judges no longer “discover” law, and
because CIL is not listed in or derived from either Article III or Article
VI, judges do not have authorization unless Congress incorporates CIL
under Article I.89 Additionally, both revisionists and recent scholars
have objected to the modern position’s wholesale incorporation of
CIL, noting that it does not take into account Congress’ actions or the
nuances of the constitutional provisions relating to CIL.90
This Article takes the view that the traditional law of nations is
within federal law. However, this position does not require that all of
CIL be incorporated into domestic law. This is partly because, as
Professors Bellia and Clark have described, the idea that CIL is
adopted wholesale into federal law disregards the nuances of how and
where in the federal constitution CIL attains it federal law status.91 As
discussed more in Part IV, Congress was given the power under Article
I to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”92 This
power would be largely unnecessary if the law of nations was already
completely incorporated into federal law.93 While it could be argued
that Congress made some action that incorporated all existing CIL, we

treaties and statutes, which are superior to state law under the Supremacy Clause.”).
88. Born, supra note 5, at 1649–50.
89. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 855–57 (arguing the modernist view,
in postulating that CIL can be incorporated without Congressional approval, is inconsistent with
Erie and basic principles of representative democracy).
90. Id. at 857; However, this is not the view of all modern position scholars. See Carlos M.
Vázquez, Customary International Law As U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and
Intermediate Positions and A Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495,
1515 (2011) (“The version of the modern position that I defend here is that customary
international law preempts State law insofar as it imposes obligations on State officials and private
parties.”).
91. Anthony Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations and the United States
Constitution: Response Article: Why Federal Courts Apply the Law of Nations Even Though it is
Not the Supreme Law of the Land, 106 GEO. L.J. 1915, 1935 (2018) [hereinafter, Bellia & Clark,
Response] (highlighting that Professors Golove and Hulsebosch’s view fails to identity the specific
Constitutional provisions that incorporate CIL in its entirety).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
93. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 857 (“Congress’s selective incorporation
[of CIL] would be largely superfluous if CIL were already incorporated wholesale into federal
common law.”).
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would have to look to each of Congress’ actions and specific
constitutional provisions. Similarly, if CIL was already incorporated
wholesale into federal law, then any actions by the political branches,
including reservations or rejections of treaties that express CIL, would
generally be pointless.94 Gary Born has similarly argued that the
modern position—in concluding that the law of nations is incorporated
wholesale into federal law—disregards “critical limitations on the
scope of federal judicial authority” and ignores recent judicial
precedent, creating an overbroad approach to CIL.95
Therefore, the modern position often ignores the limits and
foundation of federal law under the Constitution and is too broad to
accept. Courts must look to certain provisions in the Constitution and
the actions of the political branches before deciding whether certain
customs within the law of nations are incorporated into federal law.
B. The Revisionist Position
Against the backdrop of the modern position, the revisionist
position generally concludes that CIL is not federal law unless
incorporated into U.S. law by the federal political branches or the states.
These revisionist scholars include Professors Curtis Bradley, Jack
Goldsmith, David Moore, Philip Trimble, A.M. Weisberd,96 and Eric
Posner.97 Additionally, a significant portion of the en banc D.C. Circuit
has concluded that “international norms outside of those explicitly
incorporated into our domestic law by the political branches are not
part of the fabric of the law enforceable by federal courts after Erie.”98
In their first article that sparked this ongoing debate, Bradley and
Goldsmith argued that after Erie, federal courts did not have
jurisdiction based on international law and cannot impose federal
interpretations of international law on the states without direct
authorization from the executive or legislative branches of
government.99 Instead, the courts could only adopt customary

94. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2269 (1998) [hereinafter, Bradley & Goldsmith,
Incorporation].
95. Born, supra note 5, at 1655.
96. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L
L. 1 (1995).
97. JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
98. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Griffith, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing).
99. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 870.
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international law if there was some authorization by the political
branches.100 Bradley and Goldsmith invoked three central ideas that
favor this conclusion: separation of powers, federalism, and democratic
deficit.
Revisionists argue that because the Offenses Clauses—where
Congress has the power to define the offenses against the law of
nations—is the only place in the Constitution where the law of nations
is mentioned, it follows that unless Congress defines these offenses, CIL
is not federal law.101 There are only three sources of federal law named
in the Constitution, and CIL is not one of them.102
Like the modern position, the revisionist position has been hotly
debated by courts and scholars.103 It relies on the closing off of federal
general common law, a conclusion stemming from the decision in
Erie.104 As decisions following Erie noted, it did not affect the rules of
international law as to whether CIL is state or federal law.105 “The
Court in Erie could not reject ‘federal common law’ because federal
courts routinely apply such law in multiple contexts. . . . [and] there is a
broad consensus that courts can create federal common law in at least
some cases that need a federal solution, but for which the Constitution,
legislative action, and executive action have not directly supplied an
answer,” including foreign relations and international law.106
In fact, “[i]t is well established that the federal government holds
the exclusive authority to administer foreign affairs.”107 States have no
100. Id. (noting that changes to domestic law must be authorized by the political branches).
101. Id. at 856 (noting that Congress’s selective incorporation of CIL pursuant to the Offenses
Clause would be superfluous if CIL were federal law).
102. The Supremacy Clause expressly discusses that issue, providing that “[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s UnderAppreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV.
843, 936 (2007) (omitting CIL from the Supremacy Clause indicates that CIL was not meant to
bind the political branches).
103. See, e.g., Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1153 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that both the modern and revisionist position “have come under fire”); see also Koh, supra
note 74, at 1825 (discussing Professors Bradley and Goldsmith’s “assault” on the varying views).
104. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 857 (arguing that the revisionist view
“cannot survive Erie” because Erie bars judicial lawmaking).
105. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425–26 (1964) (clarifying
that even after Erie “rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps
parochial state interpretations”).
106. Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 618 (2013).
107. Gingery v. City of Glendale, 831 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)) (“Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is
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control over foreign relations, which continues to be exclusively within
federal control, and Erie did not change this fact.108 Some courts have
held that determinations of international law, including human rights
law, are federal law.109 Subsequent authors argue that the revisionist
position ignores federal authority and control over U.S. foreign
relations, and like the modern position, creates an overbroad rule.110 If
the states were permitted to incorporate CIL as they saw fit, it could
create different sets of rules for each state which, through Erie, would
be binding on federal courts absent congressional action. However,
even though several later authors argue that the revisionist position is
that CIL is state law,111 Professors Bradley and Goldsmith did not argue
so; instead they argued that CIL is not a source of federal law unless
incorporated or authorized by the appropriate domestic sovereign.112
They argued that states could adopt norms from CIL in the absence of
federal pronouncements on that issue, because “in the absence of
federal political branch authorization, CIL is not a source of federal
law.”113
Additionally, Erie did not eviscerate federal common law in the
realm of international relations.114 Courts today still recognize that
“international disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign
nations” are one of the “narrow areas” in which “federal common law”
continues to exist.”115 The majority in Erie did not change whether
federal courts could use the common law to apply or interpret the law
of nations.116 Some argue that the revisionist position “would make it
vested in the national government exclusively.”).
108. See Koh, supra note 74, at 1838–42.
109. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 423, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
110. Born, supra note 5, at 1656–57.
111. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 74, at 1828 (explaining that Professors Bradley and Goldsmith’s
view does not require that CIL be a matter of state law, given that state legislatures are unlikely
to adopt CIL as state law); Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 744 (delineating
that the revisionist position would actually subordinate CIL to conflicting state laws).
112. Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation, supra note 94, at 852–53 (arguing that post-Erie
federal courts cannot apply CIL without domestic authorization).
113. Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights
and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 472 (1997).
114. Id. at 490, 490 n.141.
115. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004); see also Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d
762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 741–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the new federal common law after Erie was not federal
law but rather “a federal rule of decision [that] is necessary to protect uniquely federal interests”).
116. Pierre N. Leval, Distant Genocides, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 231, 243 (2013) (“Erie did not in
any way involve the question of whether the federal courts possess common law powers to use in
other areas of law whose interpretation was entrusted primarily to them. (Much less did it involve
whether federal courts may apply the law of another nation or the law of nations in cases to which
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impossible for federal courts to formulate federal choice-of-law rules
for federal question cases and much other federal common law. The
federal courts can properly adopt international law as part of the
pattern of U.S. courts looking to general law to make common law.”117
However, just because CIL can be federal law through the federal
common law, this does not mean CIL must be binding on courts in the
U.S. This just means that it can potentially be domestic law. As
addressed later in this Article, the revisionists are correct: CIL is not
domestic law unless incorporated or authorized by the domestic
political branches. Erie represented the acceptance of legal
positivism—the requirement that there be a domestic source of
authority for law in this nation. It is this portion of Erie that represents
the difficulty in accepting the modern position’s conclusion of a
wholesale incorporation of the law of nations.
C. The Intermediate Position
The intermediate position seeks a middle ground between the
revisionist and modern positions. Generally, under this position, CIL
has a status between state and federal law—essentially non-preemptive
federal or non-federal law. The scholars who argue for the intermediate
position are Professor Ernest Young and Professor Michael Ramsey.
Ernest Young was the first to identify this intermediate position.118
Professor Young “advance[d] an intermediate solution based on
treating customary international law as ‘general’ law—a third category
of law, neither state nor federal in nature. This ‘general’ law would not
preempt contrary state policies . . . . But it would remain available for
both state and federal courts to apply in appropriate cases as
determined by traditional principles of the conflict of laws.”119 He
criticizes both the modern and revisionist positions as insufficient to
resolve the debate. Instead, his proposal sought a middle ground,
leaving CIL as general law—the way it was prior to Erie. However,
Professor Young has seemingly abandoned this position and moved
closer to accepting the revisionist position after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sosa.120
they apply.)”).
117. Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs. Adopting Another Sovereign’s
Law, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 243, 301 n.307 (2018).
118. See generally Young, supra note 39 (discussing the intermediate position in the law of
nations debate).
119. Id. at 370.
120. See Young, supra note 9, at 28 (2007) (“I think that CIL revisionists like Professors
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Michael Ramsey, while endorsing Professor Young’s approach,
critiques his general law theory and suggests a different middle
position.121 He claims that CIL applies in federal cases but that federal
norms are not applicable to the states under the Supremacy Clause.122
This would effectively make CIL “non-preemptive federal law”—a
middle ground between the modern and revisionists but still a part of
federal law.123
This intermediate position fails to account for the exclusivity of
international law, including CIL, as federal law. As the revisionist
position notes, the hierarchy of law under the U.S. Constitution is:
Constitution, federal law (including treaties), and state law. There is no
other type of law in the United States.124 Additionally, both of Professor
Ramsey’s arguments are contrary to the express provisions of the
Constitution: there is no source for non-preemptive federal law, and
under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law.125 As
noted by Gary Born, these creations of unprecedented types of law are
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution and judicial authority.126
Because this position has been challenged by many scholars and the
first scholar to espouse the position has since come to agree with the
revisionists, the intermediate position is of less relevance here.
D. Recent Positions
The modern and intermediate positions take a wholesale approach
to the law of nations. Determining customs in the law of nations is
nuanced, and the question of incorporation into federal law requires a
nuanced approach. Recently, there have been two additional positions
that, while similar to the modern position, are distinct for several
reasons. Both positions accept parts of the modern and the revisionist
positions rather than find a middle ground.127 Both would find CIL to
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore (with whom I consider myself at least a fellow traveler) have the
better claim on Sosa.”).
121. Michael D. Ramsey, International Law As Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L
L. 555, 585 (2002).
122. Id. at 557–58.
123. Id. at 556 (framing CIL as general common law, analogous to pre-Erie general common
law).
124. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 820 (1989) (“At the
heart of [Erie] was the positivistic insight that American law must be either federal law or state
law. There could be no overarching or hybrid third option.”).
125. Born, supra note 5, at 1656.
126. Id.
127. See id. (“[T]he better approach adopts elements of both the modernist and revisionist
positions, while rejecting other aspects of those positions.”).
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be federal law, but the law of nations would only be incorporated into
federal law under certain circumstances.
For Professors Anthony Bellia, Jr. and Bradford Clark, CIL would
be federal law only when it is based on specific powers in the
Constitution in Article I and II.128 For Gary Born, CIL would be federal
law but is not binding on the courts unless expressly or implicitly
authorized by the federal political branches. While Bellia and Clark
argue some CIL is already federal law because it is required to interpret
certain constitutional provisions, Born views CIL as non-self-executing
federal common law.129
1. Professors Bellia and Clark’s Position
Bellia and Clark argue that both the modern and the revisionist
positions fall short of accurately describing CIL’s role in federal law.
They instead conclude that “[a] better reading of the Court’s
decisions—consistent with the original public meaning of the
Constitution—is that the judiciary must apply certain traditional
principles of the law of nations when necessary to uphold the political
branches’ recognition, war, capture, and reprisal powers.”130 Rather
than look to Article III, the authors look to the text of Article I and II,
which they argue can only be understood by looking to the law of
nations. Through the exercise of these powers by either Congress or the
Senate, some CIL is incorporated into federal law or specifically
rejected due to Congress’s actions, yet the law of nations is not the
“supreme law of the land.”131 The law of nations is used as a rule of
decision in relation to a specific power in the Constitution. Rather than
128. See generally BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9 (concluding that federal law only when it
is based on specific powers in the Constitution in Article I and II).
129. Born, supra note 5, at 1707 (“U.S. courts (both federal and state) may not apply a rule of
customary international law unless the federal political branches have provided for judicial
application of the rule. This approach treats all international legal obligations of the United
States—treaties, other international agreements, and customary international law—in the same
basic manner, and ensures observance of Erie’s limits on the federal courts’ law-making
authority.”).
130. Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 838; see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. &
Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009)
(“Taken in historical context, the best reading of Supreme Court precedent . . . is that the law of
nations does not apply as preemptive federal law by virtue of any general Article III power to
fashion federal common law, but only when necessary to preserve and implement distinct Article
I and Article II powers . . . .”).
131. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Why Federal Courts Apply the Law of Nations
Even Though It Is Not the Supreme Law of the Land, 106 GEO. L.J. 1915, 1917–18 (2018) (rejecting
the claim that CIL is federal law given there is no textual support to conclude that Supremacy
Clause sub silentio accorded the law of nations federal law status).
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treating CIL as a monolithic whole, Bellia and Clark assert that “the
Constitution was designed to interact differently with distinct branches
of the law of nations, and that the Constitution requires courts to apply
different branches of the law of nations in distinct ways.”132
2. Gary Born’s Position
Preeminent international arbitration scholar Gary Born recently
weighed into this debate. He concluded that the Constitution and
precedent “require treating all rules of customary international law as
rules of federal law, but that such rules will be directly applicable in U.S.
courts only when the federal political branches have expressly or
impliedly provided for judicial application of a particular rule.”133 In his
view, this would parallel the treatment of other international
agreements, such as treaties, because international law would be federal
law—unlike the revisionists’ positions—but would only be applied in
U.S. courts if and when authorized by Congress.134
E. Summary of Positions in this Law of Nations Debate
There are several positions one could take in this debate: (1) the
modern position—CIL is federal law and is binding on the federal
government and states;135 (2) the revisionist position—CIL is not
federal law unless it is incorporated by Congress or the states;136 (3) the
intermediate position—CIL is non-preemptive federal law;137 (4) Bellia
and Clark’s position—only some customs rising to CIL are
incorporated into federal law based on the actions of the federal
government under Article I and II of the Constitution;138 or (5) Born’s
position—CIL is federal law but is not binding on the courts until
incorporated by the legislative branch.139
This Article (1) holds that the traditional law of nations is
exclusively federal law—while the modern law of nations can be

132. ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. AND BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 168 (2017).
133. Born, supra note 5, at 1642.
134. Id.
135. Koh, supra note 74, at 1825 (citing the Offenses Clause as lending international law the
force of federal law).
136. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 2260.
137. Young, supra note 39, at 371 (proposing that CIL act as neither federal nor state law but
a category of law federal and state courts may apply).
138. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9, at 37 (arguing that CIL is incorporated by treaty or
statute pursuant to the powers enumerated in Articles I and II).
139. Born, supra note 5, at 1641.
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incorporated by the states but could still be federal law if incorporated
by the federal branches—and (2) the law of nations is not incorporated
into domestic law absent constitutional authorization, or political
branch action or acquiescence to a norm within the law of nations. This
is a “revised revisionist” position because, while it agrees with the
foundation of the revisionist argument, it expands the types of
authorization necessary for CIL to be incorporated into domestic law
(such as implied authorization by the Executive Branch through
executive orders or agreements or acquiescence by the Legislative
Branch), and it holds that traditional CIL is exclusively federal through
federal law rather than state law.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS AS FEDERAL LAW
The above positions base much of their argument on Supreme
Court decisions, such as Kiobel and Sosa, which is beneficial to the
ongoing debate. However, this Article focuses more on the foundation
of the law rather than what the Court says about it to understand the
basis of CIL’s incorporation or rejection as domestic law. The law of
nations is not domestic law unless there is authorization from a
domestic source—the Constitution or the political branches.
The Constitution was written at a time where the law of nations was
well-known, and the Founders knew well of the implications.140 The
Constitution was designed to simply be the “broad outline” and was
not created to account for all possible circumstances.141 It was meant to
be interpreted in light of CIL,142 and some of the provisions cannot be
interpreted without looking to the law of nations for support or
understanding.143 Take for example, the Eighth Amendment: “nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”144 It would be very difficult for a
court to determine what “unusual” punishment is without looking

140. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 455 (2011) (noting interpretations of Alien Tort Statute have
relied on theories of framer intent because Constitutional framers were intimately familiar with
the law of nations).
141. Steven A. Engel, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne
v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 118 (1999); M’Culloch
v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
142. Ezequiel Lugo, The Unfinished Business of American Democracy, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 871,
882 (2007).
143. Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 733 (“Although the Constitution
mentions the ‘law of nations’ only in the Offences Clause, a number of other discrete
constitutional provisions can only be understood by reference to that body of law.”).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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around to other countries to see what is “usual.”145 This is exactly what
happened in Roper v. Simmons, when the Supreme Court looked to the
status of capital punishment for juveniles in other countries and the
international community.146 Similarly, the “Guarantee” Clause of the
U.S. Constitution147 cannot properly be understood or defined without
looking to international treaties and the law of nations.148 For example,
what does the term “guarantee” actually mean, and does a guaranteed
party forfeit its sovereign rights?149
There are three traditional different types of CIL: (1) law merchant;
(2) law of state-state relations; and (3) law maritime.150 These three
types regulate interactions between states rather than their internal
actions within the state. Professors Bellia and Clark focus a significant
portion of their argument distinguishing between these different types
of CIL and discussing how the Constitution treats each of these types.151
Modern CIL creates a different category within the law of nations that
arose around the time of World War II, consisting of a different type of
law and founded on a diverse basis of state practice.152 Because it has a
different foundation of state practice, the incorporation of the modern
law of nations requires a different analysis on this question, as discussed
below.
145. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Yet at least from the time of the Court’s
decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international
authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel
and unusual punishments.’”); Graham v. Florida., 560 U.S. 48, 80 (2010), modified (July 6, 2010)
(“The Court has looked beyond our Nation’s borders for support for its independent conclusion
that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual.”); Penn Law, Debating Use of International
Law in US Jurisprudence: Deborah Pearlstein & Ilya Shapiro (10/5/2009) at 28:20–30:00,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l4KoV67GFRI.
146. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (“In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone
in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”).
147. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.”).
148. Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee Clause,” 132 HARV. L. REV, 7, 13, 70 (2018).
149. Id. at 57, 67, 70.
150. Id.; John T. Parry, International Law in State Courts: Sovereignty, Resistance, Contagion,
and Inevitability, 20 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 62 (2012) (“By the time of the
American Revolution, English jurisprudence recognized three components of international law:
the law of state-state relations, the law merchant, and maritime law.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *66.
151. See generally BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9 (arguing that the Constitution treats
different types of CIL differently).
152. See Chris Downes, Must the Losers of Free Trade Go Hungry? Reconciling WTO
Obligations and the Right to Food, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 619, 668 (2007) (describing modern CIL’s
identity crisis and departure from custom).
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A. The Traditional Law of Nations is Exclusively Federal Law While
the Modern Law of Nations May be Adopted by the States
As noted by many of the scholars in this debate, there are
differences between the traditional and the modern law of nations.153
While traditional CIL regulates interactions between states, the
modern law of nations specifically regulates internal decisions, such as
environmental regulation or the protection of individual rights.154 It
does not require any determination of the actions between nations but
rather by nations within their own borders. Unlike the law of state-state
relations or the law maritime, modern CIL does not require the entire
nation to speak as one voice and does not necessarily involve
interactions with foreign countries.155
The first question is whether CIL is federal or state law.This focuses
solely on who can incorporate or control CIL norms within the U.S.;
the next section will discuss whether those norms are in fact part of
domestic law. As revisionist, modernist, and intermediate authors have
acknowledged, the courts have long said that traditional CIL is a part
of federal law. Much of the law relating to foreign relations or
international affairs has been exclusively given to the federal
government due to the Constitution’s allocation of the commerce
recognition powers.156 Relationships with other nations and those
powers associated with international relations are exclusively within

153. Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in
Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 644 n.340 (2018) (“Some have argued, however, that
‘modern’ customary international law can be established based on evidence of opinio juris
alone.”).
154. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 759 (2001) (noting the diversity of
issues international law now addresses in light of the increase in the diversity and number of
states).
155. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (concluding that the Framers
understood that “the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign relations,
could not be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive power”).
156. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483 (1887) (“In our federal system, ‘the
Government of the United States has been vested exclusively with the power of representing the
nation in all its intercourse with foreign countries.’ It alone can ‘regulate commerce with foreign
nations,’ [and] make treaties and appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.’”
By contrast, “[a] state is expressly prohibited from entering into any ‘treaty, alliance, or
confederation.’ ‘Thus all official intercourse between a state and foreign nations is prevented, and
exclusive authority for that purpose [is] given to the United States. The national government is in
this way made responsible to foreign nations for all violations by the United States of their
international obligations, and because of this, Congress is expressly authorized ‘to define and
punish . . . offences against the law of nations.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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the federal government’s authority.157 State courts have accepted this
exclusive federal authority over international relations and have
declined to extend state rules into this realm.158 This is because
interactions with other countries have been vested by the Constitution
to the federal government, including foreign commerce, appointing
ambassadors, and establishing treaties.159
As reaffirmed in Jesner, when the United States interacts with a
foreign country, the federal government has exclusive power.160 Even
so, as discussed in the next section, those CIL norms must still be
incorporated by the political branches to become law; the conclusion
here just means the norms of the traditional law of nations relating to
interactions with foreign countries cannot be adopted or rejected by
the individual states within the U.S.
It might be viewed as strange that a revisionist argument would
accept federal exclusivity over the traditional norms of CIL. However,
it often makes the most practical sense that federal law would have
exclusive control over the traditional norms because, in those instances,
foreign affairs requires the nation to “speak with one voice” and not
leave the interactions to fifty different states. With this concession in
mind, the discussion regarding whether states may adopt traditional
CIL becomes essentially moot as “the federal political branches have

157. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (holding that “the
United States is vested with all the powers of government necessary to maintain an effective
control of international relations”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425
(1964) (stating that “our relationships with other members of the international community must
be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law”).
158. Alvez v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 461, 462–63 (N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 446 U.S. 274
(1980) (“To be distinguished, however, are those unique areas, such as admiralty and maritime
matters, which either by Constitution or Congressional legislation have been deemed to require
a uniform body of national law. In such areas not only does there exist a Federal question, but
more importantly, an answer obtainable solely by recourse to Federal law.”) (internal citations
omitted); Amarel v. Connell, 202 Cal. App. 3d 137, 145 (Cal. App. 1988) (“The conduct of foreign
affairs and international relations is an exclusively federal concern. ‘Our system of government is
such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of
the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations
be left entirely free from local interference.’”) (internal citations omitted).
159. See notes 142–144. Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 733 (“Although
the Constitution mentions the ‘law of nations’ only in the Offences Clause, a number of other
discrete constitutional provisions can only be understood by reference to that body of law.”); U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80 (2010), modified (July 6, 2010) (“The
Court has looked beyond our Nation’s borders for support for its independent conclusion that a
particular punishment is cruel and unusual.”); Penn Law, supra note 145, at 28:20-30:00.
160. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) (“The political branches, not the
Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.”).
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incorporated this traditional CIL into enacted federal law.”161 Many
traditional CIL norms are generally codified in federal legislation, so
states could not adopt other norms without contradicting federal law.
Unlike traditional CIL norms, modern CIL norms are not
exclusively within federal power—they instead can be adopted by
states in the absence of federal legislation. Prior to the signing of the
Constitution in 1787, the law of nations was part of individual state
law,162 as each state was its own sovereign. After the Constitution was
ratified but before Erie, state courts repeatedly determined that the law
of nations was the law of the state.163 Even today, states have played an
essential role in shaping and changing the law of nations, and not all of
the law of nations has been held to be exclusively federal law.164 “States
are separate and independent sovereigns,” both before and after the
signing of the Constitution,165 bound by the federal Constitution and
federal law.166 In essence, prior to 1787, states themselves were the
sovereigns and retained most of that sovereignty after the Founding.167
The exclusive federal power over foreign affairs is clear for
traditional CIL—in place at the time of the Founding—yet it is not
certain this same exclusivity applies to modern CIL, which was not yet
created at the prior to the 20th century. This federal foreign affairs
preemption has greatly expanded since the beginning of the modern
161. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation, supra note 94, at 2261.
162. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 116 (Pa. O. & T. 1784) (“The first crime in
the indictment is an infraction of the law of Nations. This law, in its full extent, is part of the law
of this State, and is to be collected from the practice of different Nations, and the authority of
writers.”).
163. See, e.g., Collie v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 431, 443 (1873) (quoting Richardson v. Me. Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 6 Mass. 102, 112 (1818) (“And here it is said that these voyages are prohibited
by the law of nations[] which forms a part of the municipal law of every state . . . .”) (omission in
original); Wilcocks v. Union Ins. Co., 2 Binn. 574, 581 (Pa. 1809) (“In this respect I do not see any
material difference between a law of our own state, and a law of nations. We consider the law of
nations as part of our law.”); see Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the
Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of
Nations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 254 (2008) (citing state cases).
164. Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265, 269
(2001) [hereinafter Ku, State Courts] (“My analysis of these doctrines reveals that, in many cases,
state courts acted as the primary judicial fora for originating, developing, and applying rules of
CIL. Indeed, in several cases, federal courts explicitly disclaimed any authority to review state
court interpretations of these CIL doctrines.”).
165. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 579 (2012).
166. Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 499 (1981) (“[A]lthough the States are sovereign entities,
they are bound along with their officials, including their judges, by the Constitution and the
federal statutory law.”).
167. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
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law of nations to include many domestic concerns that can now touch
on international law.168 Yet the federal government’s powers are
expressly limited; the text of the Constitution does not imply that
federal foreign affairs preemption extends into areas that were clearly
within the states’ prerogatives at the time of the Founding.169 Modern
CIL does not involve the same type of regulation, because it does not
arise from the same type of state practice, and it does not require that
the nation “speak with one voice.”170 It is unlikely that federal
preemption applies to modern CIL, which touches on many internal
workings of states.
Because modern CIL—which just became prevalent this past
century—is sufficiently different from traditional CIL—which arose
before the Constitution was written—the determination that all
traditional CIL is exclusively within federal law cannot be conclusive
as to modern CIL. The states have always been a source of redress for
individual wrongs, and in the case of modern human rights CIL, “what
presumptively seemed a ‘foreign relations’ matter for the federal
government alone now appears a remedial matter presumptively for
state courts to decide.”171 Therefore, modern CIL implicates few of the
same concerns that traditional CIL creates, and the Constitution has
not expressly granted the federal government power over all these
norms within the modern law of nations.
The same is not true for modern CIL. If a state were to adopt a
modern CIL norm for the internal protection of its own citizens—for
example, the prohibition of torture within its borders172—this would
168. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 176
(2000) (“[A]s foreign affairs and international law expand to include issues at the core of the
states’ reserved power . . . . there may well be states-rights-based limitations on the federal
government’s power to regulate traditional state prerogatives that implicate U.S. foreign
relations.”).
169. See id. at 188–89 (emphasizing that the Constitution preferences federal regulation for
areas such as war, peace, and diplomacy, “it does not suggest that the Constitution biases federal
over state power in the many other regulatory contexts traditionally regulated by states . . . .”).
170. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation, supra note 94, at 2264 (1998) (“The CIL of
human rights does not arise in that fashion, however, because many nations continue to commit
human rights violations. Rather, much of the new CIL arises from international pronouncements
such as resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and multilateral treaty regimes.”).
171. Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 397, 405 (2018).
172. See Eric Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, Understanding the Resemblance between Modern
and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 666–67 (2000) (describing
the decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881–84 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court’s
restriction on torture was based on U.N. declarations and treaties, and on writings of jurists, not
on state practice).
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seem unlikely to undermine any uniquely federal purpose and purely
domestic actions would be unlikely to affect international relations.173
How can the federal government argue that a state’s increased
protection of its own citizens would undermine foreign relations?174
Yes, the federal government may insist on reservations to a specific
human rights treaty, for example, and a state’s adoption of this treaty in
spite of the reservations could potentially undermine that federal
pronouncement.175 But the state has an interest in protecting its citizens
which is not a uniquely federal interest.
The Erie doctrine requires that federal courts in diversity apply the
law of the state in which they sit. If that state has adopted a custom
from the modern law of nations, this would require the federal court to
apply this custom.176 In this case, state law would bind a federal court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction and could assert control over other
foreign states.177 And some may dismiss that as untenable. But states
have long been involved with the evolution of the law of nations.178
States often act in ways that affect foreign relations within their
allocated powers, such as taxation on multinational corporations179 and
173. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (“That the courts should ever
invoke the Charming Betsy canon in favor of United States citizens is doubtful, because a violation
of the law of nations as against a United States citizen is unlikely to bring about the international
discord that the canon guards against.”).
174. William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L. REV.
653, 670 (2007) (“If a state court decides that the death penalty should be forbidden in
prosecutions brought under state law, such a decision is entirely that [S]tate’s business. Whether
the state court so decides as a matter of customary international law . . . should make no
difference.”).
175. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (“A state law, however, with no
more than an ‘incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries’ will be valid.”). See generally
Gerling Glob. Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 752 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing
cases where the Supreme Court and other circuit courts addressed foreign affairs challenges
related to state laws).
176. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
state.”); Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. v. AFG Indus. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1043–44 (D. Del. 1984)
(“As a federal court operating under diversity jurisdiction, this Court must apply Delaware state
law of international comity under the principles of [Erie].”); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional
Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 98 n.48 (1999) (“Indeed, in a diversity
action, according to the post-Erie case law, the federal court looks to state law on recognition of
a foreign judgment.”).
177. See Ku, State Courts, supra note 164, at 267–68 (2001) (“[T]he idea that CIL could
become part of state common law, and that state court interpretations of CIL would bind federal
courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction, has been dismissed by highly respected scholars as ‘bizarre,’
‘radical,’ and ‘absurd.’”).
178. See id. at 269 (“My analysis of these doctrines reveals that, in many cases, state courts
acted as the primary judicial fora for originating, developing, and applying rules of CIL.”).
179. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
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the recognition of foreign money judgments.180 “[G]lobalization has
caused virtually everything, including economic matters, to at least
marginally implicate foreign affairs.”181 States have continued to
participate in activities that touch briefly or directly on international
law or foreign affairs, including immigration issues and environmental
regulations.182 Only a few years after Erie, the Second Circuit looked to
New York state law in diversity jurisdiction, concluding that “although
the courts of that state look to international law as a source of New
York law, their interpretation of international law is controlling upon
us.”183 There is little reason that states cannot adopt modern CIL norms,
such as those included in human rights treaties, to regulate those within
their own borders.184
Professors Bellia and Clark focus much of their argument on the
fact that if courts were required to apply human rights CIL, this would
harm other nations’ sovereignty and likely impact U.S. relations with
that state. Their arguments rely on this in distinguishing how modern
human rights CIL is different from “old” state-to-state CIL because it
regulates how other states oversee their citizens.185 As Bellia and Clark
have stated: “Modern customary international law restricts how

1620 (1997) (“Sometimes, states act in ways that adversely affect U.S. foreign relations but that
do not violate any provision of the Constitution and that are not preempted by federal statute or
treaty.”).
180. See Grace A. Jubinsky, State and Municipal Governments React Against South African
Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
543, 567–68 (1985) (describing examples of “activities regularly undertaken by states that have
obvious foreign relations ramifications [that] may be evidence of the leeway afforded to states.”).
181. Edward T. Hayes, Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the International
Economic System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal States and the Regional and
Local Governments Within Their Territories, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 16–17 (2004).
182. Jean Galbraith, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism Foreign
Affairs Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2131, 2132 (2017) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON AND
ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY
(2016)) (“Just as issues once viewed as local matters increasingly came to be seen as national, so
now they are increasingly taken to have transnational significance.”).
183. See Bergman v. De Sieyes., 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948) (concluding that New York
state courts would apply international law and decide that a diplomat in transit would be provided
diplomatic immunity).
184. See Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance
with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 463 (2004) (“States have consistently fulfilled other
kinds of international obligations that have intersected with areas of traditional state legislative
authority. For example, states have played a central role in compliance with treaty and customary
international law obligations affecting probate proceedings, local property and gasoline tax
immunities, injuries to alien residents, notaries, family law, commercial law, and other areas. In
sum, states play a much more significant and substantial role in the implementation of
international law obligations than most commentators have recognized or endorsed.”).
185. See Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 835-37.
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nations treat their own citizens within their own territory, and did not
exist at the Founding. Accordingly, the Constitution contains no
provisions designed to facilitate the application of such law in the U.S.
legal system.”186
Additionally, courts have determined that Congress can enact laws
that essentially violate the law of nations.187 But when Congress enacts
a statute relating to the law of nations, but not necessarily in violation
of it, there is a rule for the courts to follow—the Charming Betsy
canon.188 While this will not overrule or reverse a statute, courts will
follow this principle of interpretation to construe a statute in
compliance with international law where possible.189 The purpose of
this canon is to prevent international law violations by the United
States and to limit the scope of the courts’ statutory interpretation.190
Furthermore, there is a presumption against extraterritoriality of
statutory application, which also limits the courts’ reach into foreign
corporations and individuals.191 This presumption “helps ensure that
the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law
that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the
political branches.”192 Moreover, as “[a] long-standing common law
principle, the act of state doctrine precludes courts from evaluating the
validity of actions that a foreign government has taken within its own
borders,” reflecting the concern of the courts that questioning the

186. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9, at 270.
187. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Mindful that ‘Congress has the
power to legislate beyond the limits posed by international law,’ we do not review federal law for
adherence to the law of nations with the same rigor that we apply when we must review statutes
for adherence to the Constitution.”).
188. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(announcing what is known as the Charming Betsy canon under which “an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce,
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country”).
189. See, e.g., Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 53 (1st Cir. 2017) (describing cases that
demonstrate that the principle from Charming Betsy is “firmly established”). But see Serra, 600
F.3d at 1198 (applying the minority rule that courts “invoke the Charming Betsy canon only where
conformity with the law of nations is relevant to considerations of international comity, and only
‘where it is possible to do so without distorting the statute.’”).
190. Kevin L. Cope, Congress’s International Legal Discourse, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1115, 1128
(2015) (“[T]he canon can also be conceived as a form of ‘soft’ judicial review, in that courts can
use it to nullify a statute at odds with international law.”).
191. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010) (“When a statute gives
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”).
192. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013).
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validity of foreign sovereign’s actions within its own borders would
“interfere with the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy.”193
A recent example involves the Paris Climate Agreement. After the
Trump administration withdrew, several states and cities, including
California and Washington, joined several other nations to implement
protections against rapid climate change and maintain the Paris
Agreement.194 This resulted in solely internal state regulations by those
states and cities. States can adopt stricter or higher standards than
federal protections,195 and it should be no different in the context of the
intrastate adoption of CIL. While this may have a tangential effect on
foreign businesses or peoples, this type of internal working does not
directly relate to the international relations of the country, and like
Barclays,196 Congress and the states should decide the issue.
These doctrines and their underlying purposes are to prevent
judicial interference in foreign relations. The adoption of modern CIL
by states into their own domestic law implicates none of these concerns,
as it merely197 certain human rights within those states.198 But this does
not imply that a foreign state would be subject to these state-

193. Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2009).
194. See Reuters, California and Washington state join carbon pledge in defiance of Trump,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2017, 11:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-summitamericas/california-and-washington-state-join-carbon-pledge-in-defiance-of-trump-idUSKBN1
E625E; Dakin Andone & Nicole Chavez, US mayors, governors vow to stick with Paris accord,
CNN (June 2, 2017, 12:23 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/01/us/trump-climate-deal-citiesstates-defying/index.html.
195. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (“States . . . [are] free to impose
higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution.”) (citation
and quotation omitted); Op. of the Justices, 122 N.H. 199, 204 (1982) (describing in the context
of burdens of proof for civil commitment, that “[u]nder our federal system, however, the States
are free to interpret their own constitutions and adopt stricter due process standards as long as
they meet the federally prescribed minimum”).
196. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 330–31 (1994)
(“The Constitution does ‘not make the judiciary the overseer of our government.’ Having
determined that the taxpayers before us had an adequate nexus with the State, that worldwide
combined reporting led to taxation which was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, fairly related
to the services provided by the State, and that its imposition did not result inevitably in multiple
taxation, we leave it to Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation’s-to evaluate whether the
national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.”).
197. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (“That the courts should ever
invoke the Charming Betsy canon in favor of United States citizens is doubtful, because a
violation of the law of nations as against a United States citizen is unlikely to bring about the
international discord that the canon guards against.”).
198. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern
and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 672 (2000) (“The essential
difference is content: old CIL focused on commercial and military relationships between states;
modern CIL focuses on human rights. But similarities overwhelm this difference.”).
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incorporated norms outside the jurisdiction Congress has already
created. The question of whether a foreign sovereign is subject to
jurisdiction in a state or federal court is separate from whether CIL can
be adopted by a state rather than the federal government. Therefore,
modernist scholars’ and Bellia and Clark’s fears that state-adopted CIL
norms would destroy national sovereignty by forcing U.S. courts to
impose human rights on other countries is not necessarily a concern.199
B. The Law of Nations is not Incorporated into Federal Law unless
Authorized by the Federal Political Branches
To understand the nature of the law of nations within U.S. law, we
must understand the basis of U.S. law itself. The basic question is: what
is law in the U.S.? Erie is not necessarily relevant in this Part for
determining whether CIL is state or federal law.200 Rather, Erie
represented the evolution of U.S. law into an “embrace of legal
positivism.”201 Legal positivism rejects general law—which Erie
explicitly did—and requires the law to be a command of an identifiable
domestic sovereign.202 Legal positivism is a position about what
constitutes law.203 Since at least the time of Erie, it has been a driving
legal theory in American jurisprudence,204 which Ronald Dworkin has
termed the “ruling theory of law” in America.205 U.S. courts have
199. See Yaodi Hu v. Communist Party of China, No. 1:12-CV-1213, 2012 WL 7160373, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2012), report and recommendation approved, No. 1:12-CV-1213, 2013 WL
634719 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2013) (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 434–35 n.1 (1989)) (“From the nation’s founding, foreign states were generally
granted complete immunity from suit in United States courts. Congress codified this principle in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which applies to all claims against sovereign states,
including claims under the ATS.”) (internal citations omitted).
200. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation, supra note 94, at 2265 (“What is significant is
Erie’s rejection of general common law (of which CIL was a part), and its related requirement
that federal courts ground the application of federal common law in the Constitution or a federal
enactment.”).
201. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 852 (“This strand of Erie requires federal
courts to identify the sovereign source for every rule of decision.”).
202. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism,
and A Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 116 (1993) (“In this system,
there is no room for a corpus of law without an identifiable sovereign.”).
203. Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L.
REV. 673, 701 (1998) (“Because legal positivism is a position about what constitutes law while
Erie concerns the proper role of federal courts in lawmaking, legal positivism has nothing to say
about the latter.”).
204. See Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2056 (1995)
(noting that “scholars today treat legal positivism as a major–if not the major–jurisprudence in
America”).
205. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii (1977) (assigning the name
because the theory has been so popular and influential).
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embraced legal positivism as the basis for law in the U.S.206 While some
scholars such as Dworkin have taken issue with legal positivism,207 his
alternative basis for law as expounded in his work LAW’S EMPIRE is
quite similar to that of legal positivism.208
Whether legal positivism or a theory like Dworkin’s is the correct
theory for the basis of law in the United States, they have the same
underlying requirement: that the law come from an identifiable
authoritative sovereign209 as “the judiciary requires an identifiable
source of authority for any valid exercise of lawmaking powers.”210 This
source can be the Constitution, federal statutes, treaties, or certain acts
of the executive or congressional branches.211 In essence, rights must
emanate from an adjudicative body.212
Alone, CIL does not “emanate” from an appropriate domestic
sovereign in the United States, and therefore does not satisfy the
positivist requirement to be automatically incorporated into federal
law without some additional authorization from a domestic source.213
CIL itself has a positivist foundation, as the law of nations requires
consent of the nations to be bound through a sense of legal

206. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 511 (1998) (“As the nineteenth
century progressed, courts and commentators began to embrace positivism. As a result, the
natural law conception of international law faded and was replaced by an emphasis on state
practice and consent.”); Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051,
1119 (2010) (noting “Erie’s embrace of positivism”).
207. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (describing issues
with legal positivism).
208. See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1912
(2004) (“Dworkin has often insisted that law is simply what lawyers and judges do.”). Dworkin’s
theory of the law is that “[g]eneral theories of law, for us, are general interpretations of our own
judicial practice.” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 410 (1986).
209. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 825, 891 (2005) (“[T]he rise of positivistic legal thought led courts to conclude that
all law . . . must be attributable to a sovereign source”); Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion
that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 867
(1989) (stating that “post-Erie positivism has cleansed American courts of law lacking an
identifiable sovereign source”).
210. Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 892, 955 (2004).
211. See George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal
Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 285, 288 (1993) (“Any major extension of federal power must
find its source in the Constitution or in a federal statute, not in the common law decisions of
federal judges alone.”).
212. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 406 (2011).
213. See Young, supra note 9, at 34 (“As it exists on the international plane, CIL is derived
from the mandate of no particular sovereign. Rather, it is a collective product arising out of the
practice of many nations.”).
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obligation.214 The law of nations is built by state practice but is only
binding on the states if states follow from a sense of legal obligation—
the state’s consent.215 But this is not so in the domestic sense, as
domestic sources have not fully adopted CIL into our own domestic
law.
The law of nations has not been incorporated wholesale into
domestic law.216 Congress was given the power under Article I to
“define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”217 No
phrase or clause in the Constitution is superfluous or irrelevant,218 yet
the modern scholars’ argument would make this power immaterial.
This express constitutional authority, and any actions by Congress
under this power, would be largely irrelevant if the law of nations was
already incorporated wholesale into domestic law.219 While one could
argue that Congress through some action incorporated all or a portion
of existing CIL at some point in time, we have to look to Congress’
actions and specific constitutional provisions. Similarly, if CIL was
already incorporated wholesale into federal law, then any actions by the
political branches, including reservations or rejections of treaties that
express CIL, would generally be pointless.220 For example, only three
years after the signing of the Constitution, Congress incorporated the
law of nation’s definition of piracy into domestic law.221 If the first
Congress had thought CIL was already incorporated as binding law,
214. See John C. Dehn, Customary International Law, the Separation of Powers, and the
Choice of Law in Armed Conflicts and Wars, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2105 (2016) (“Grotius
[and others] viewed the law of nations in positivist terms. He explained that the rules of the law
of nations arise from the consent of nations, not from the law of nature, and therefore may differ
in different parts of the world. This clearly articulates a positivist view of international law.”).
215. See Ines Gillich, The Normativity of Principles Within the Positivist Theory of
International Law, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2015)
216. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, Chief Judge, with
Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland, and Griffith, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc) (concluding that “nothing in the Constitution compels the domestic
incorporation of international law”).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
218. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction
is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900) (“[T]he
elementary canon of construction which requires that effect be given to each word of the
Constitution.”).
219. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 857 (“Congress’s selective
incorporation [of CIL] would be largely superfluous if CIL were already incorporated wholesale
into federal common law.”).
220. Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation, supra note 94, at 2269.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012) (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall
be imprisoned for life.”).
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then this act in 1790 would have been superfluous. Certainly, Congress
has not incorporated much, if any, of the modern CIL into federal law.
As Professors Bellia and Clark note: “None of these cases, however,
applied customary international law as ‘federal common law’—a
modern construct unknown at the Founding.”222
Turning to case law, Supreme Court precedent does not support the
modern position. For example, modern scholars such as Professor
Harold Koh rely heavily on the statement in Paquete Habana that
“[i]nternational law is part of our law.”223 Besides the fact that this
decision was prior to Erie—making this and other pre-Erie precedent
generally unsupportive of the modern position due to Erie’s rejection
of the federal general common law—it does not account for the more
recent decisions in which the modern position was effectively denied.224
And, at the time of Paquete Habana, modern CIL had not yet emerged,
giving little foundation to the modern scholars’ arguments relating to
the new law of nations.
In the case often most relied on by modern scholars, Sabbatino, the
Supreme Court determined that “United States courts apply
international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances.”225
The Supreme Court specifically limited this application to “appropriate
circumstances,” yet there is no definition of what an “appropriate
circumstance” is, nor would it make sense that CIL was fully
incorporated in federal law if courts would only apply it in those
situations, whatever those may be.226
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has essentially rejected the
underlying theory of the modern position. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
the Supreme Court stated that the Court knew “of no reason” that their
jurisdiction was extended to include all common law claims arising
from the law of nations.227 In fact, the Sosa Court expressly cautioned

222. Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 829–30.
223. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
224. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation, supra note 94, at 2265 (“These elements of
Erie, combined with the substantial changes in the nature of CIL, mean that the pre-Erie
precedents by themselves provide no support for the modern position’s application of CIL as
federal common law. Thus, recourse to pre-Erie practice cannot legitimize the modern position’s
federalization of CIL.”).
225. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (emphasis added).
226. Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 814.
227. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.19 (2004) (“Section 1350 was enacted on
the congressional understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some
common law claims derived from the law of nations; and we know of no reason to think that
federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable congressional assumption.
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lower courts to be restrained in adopting common law causes of actions
from the law of nations, specifically the traditional CIL:
Accordingly, we think courts should require any claim based on the
present day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms
we have recognized. This requirement is fatal to Alvarez’s claim.228

Case law in the United States appears to favor the revisionist
position, as demonstrated by the reasoning in multiple recent Supreme
Court cases. For example, in Medellín v. Texas the Supreme Court
addressed whether judgments of the International Court of Justice are
enforceable by the courts under federal law.229 The Court determined
that “while treaties ‘may comprise international commitments . . . they
are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing
statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘selfexecuting’ and is ratified on these terms.’”230 It would be implausible to
believe that treaties, which are defined and expressly consented to by
nations, must have congressional approval to be executed, while CIL—
which is undefined and not expressly accepted by nations—does not
need this authorization. This supports the revisionist position’s
reasoning that international law, including treaties, are not domestic
law until incorporated by the political branches.
Finally, the most recent case to touch on this subject, Jesner v. Arab
Bank, again implicitly rejected the modern position’s claims, lending
credence to the argument that the revisionist position is more correct
under the law. In Jesner, the Supreme Court concluded that “any
imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations
of international law must be determined in the first instance by the
political branches of the Government.”231 The Court instead held the
political branches must determine this question—essentially upholding
the revisionist’s conclusion that there must be political branch
authorization before domestic courts can apply the law of nations. As
demonstrated here, the Court has implicitly adopted the revisionists’
Further, our holding today is consistent with the division of responsibilities between federal and
state courts after Erie, as a more expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 might
not be.”).
228. Id. at 725.
229. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
230. Id. at 505 (quoting Igartua–De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc)).
231. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018).
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conclusion that the law of nations must be authorized by the domestic
political branches prior to judicial application.
While the Supreme Court has only implicitly affirmed the
revisionist position, several circuit courts have expressly adopted the
revisionist holdings.232 For example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
“customary international law is not a source of judicially enforceable
private rights in the absence of a statute conferring jurisdiction over
such claims.”233 Similarly, almost the entire D.C. Circuit, in affirming the
revisionist position, wrote: “international norms outside of those
explicitly incorporated into our domestic law by the political branches
are not part of the fabric of the law enforceable by federal courts after
Erie.”234 The Sixth Circuit proclaimed in Buell v. Mitchell:
We hold that the determination of whether customary international
law prevents a State from carrying out the death penalty, when the
State otherwise is acting in full compliance with the Constitution, is
a question that is reserved to the executive and legislative branches
of the United States government, as it their constitutional role to
determine the extent of this country’s international obligations and
how best to carry them out.235

While the Sixth Circuit limited their holding in this statement
specifically to the death penalty and declined to take a position in the
debate between the revisionists and the modern scholars at that time,236
their reasoning aligns directly with the revisionist position.237 Notably,
the Second Circuit does not appear to take this position, instead
choosing to side with pre-Erie precedent even after Sosa.238

232. The Seventh Circuit has expressed uncertainty as to whether the pre-Erie case law
supports the domestic incorporation of CIL. Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d
1145, 1153 (7th Cir. 2001).
233. Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010).
234. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, Ginsburg, Henderson,
Rogers, Tatel, Garland, and Griffith, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
235. Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2001).
236. Id. at 376 n.10.
237. District courts are much less uniform in their decisions, likely due to the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to provide guidance on this question. Compare, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[I]t is well settled that the body of principles that comprise customary
international law is subsumed and incorporated by federal common law.”), with In re XE Servs.
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 579 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“It is clear, then, that Sosa does not
incorporate customary international law (“CIL”) into the body of federal common law in a
wholesale manner.”).
238. See Oliva v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing pre-Erie
precedent).
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In the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal courts are
bound by three sets of laws: (1) the Constitution; (2) federal law; and
(3) treaties.239 CIL does not fall into any of these categories. Instead,
the law of nations is created by the amalgamation of decisions,
statements, and interpretations of state action.240 Because federal
common law and the law of nations are not listed among these, it is
unlikely the Founders meant to require application of the law of
nations wholesale, much less have them preempt state law in all cases.241
Additionally, federal common law is limited to very few areas that are
heavily restricted—(1) those in which a federal rule of decision is
“necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,” and (2) those in which
Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.242
Federal law has not fully incorporated CIL norms, and without
some type of authorization by domestic powers, the judiciary cannot
enforce the law of nations within the U.S.243 We can understand the
“revised revisionist” conclusion described in this Article by alluding to
the hierarchy of presidential power derived from the famous Justice
Jackson concurrence in the Youngstown Steel.244 Like the Executive
239. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
240. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 508
n.16 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that the Supremacy Clause “does not easily include [customary]
international law,” because CIL is not a treaty and is not made pursuant to the Constitution, but
rather is made by the world community “in a process to which the United States contributes only
in an uncertain way and to an indeterminate degree”);
241. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers As A Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1323–24 (2001) (“Although the Supremacy Clause performs the familiar function of
securing the primacy of federal law over contrary state law, it also necessarily constrains the
exercise of federal power by recognizing only three sources of law as ‘the supreme Law of the
Land.’ . . . Accordingly, ‘federal law’ adopted outside these procedures does not clearly fall within
the terms of the Supremacy Clause, and thus provides a questionable basis for displacing state
law.”).
242. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
243. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Our duty is to enforce
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law of the land to
norms of customary international law.”).
244. Justice Jackson explained the power of the Executive in relation to congressional powers,
breaking the discussion into three categories:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said
(for what it may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President
pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions
and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would
rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
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Branch, the judiciary has limited powers in relation to Congress when
applying, incorporating, or interpreting the law of nations as U.S.
federal law:245
1. When the law of nations is pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress or the Constitution,246 the judiciary’s
authority “is at its maximum” to apply and interpret the law of
nations as federal law.
2.When the law of nations arises in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, the judiciary can only rely on the
judiciary’s own independent powers to interpret domestic
constitutional and statutory law in appropriate circumstances.247
3. When the law of nations is incompatible with the express or
implied will of the political branches, the judiciary is at “its lowest
ebb” of power as the judicial branch can only rely on its own powers
to apply and interpret the congressional will or the federal
Constitution.

While this is not an exacting analogy, the list above provides a good
understanding for the general situations of where and how the law of
nations is incorporated (or not) into federal law under the revised

authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
245. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 645 (2018) (applying the Youngstown framework to assess the authority of
non-executive actions).
246. See Bradley et al., supra note 20, at 935 (“The application of foreign law in both contexts
might be viewed as consistent with Erie’s positivism because in both contexts the Court relies on
a domestic sovereign source that purportedly makes relevant the foreign and international
materials, and because the resulting legal conclusions reflect domestic U.S. law.”).
247. See Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 913–14 (1996)
(“The federal common law making power recognized by the Court encompassed the authority to
formulate federal common law rules whenever either the Constitution or Congress has
‘federalized’ an area of the law but has failed to provide rules of decision for all issues that may
arise.”).
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revisionist position. Before the judiciary can apply or reject the law of
nations, courts must first look to whether Congress or the Constitution
has expressly or impliedly authorized or rejected this particular custom
within the law of nations.
The first situation—where Congress has expressly or impliedly
authorized the law of nations to be federal law—is the most
straightforward, as courts simply apply the codified law of nations to
the case at hand. Situations falling under this category include the
codification of CIL such as sovereign immunity, which, prior to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,248 was part of the law of nations.249
This category of power also includes implied authorization of Congress
or the Constitution to the law of nations.250
An example of implicit authorization is in the prohibition of capital
punishment of minors. Under the Eighth Amendment, the U.S. cannot
inflict “cruel and unusual punishments.”251 It would be very difficult for
a court to determine what “unusual” punishment is without looking
around to other countries to see what is “usual.”252 This is what
happened in Roper v. Simmons when the Supreme Court looked to the
status of capital punishment for juveniles in other countries and the
international community.253 In the Court’s analysis of the current
international status of capital punishment for minors, the Court saw
that the U.S. was alone among the world in permitting this, even though
the U.S. had previously attached reservations to a treaty, stating that the
U.S.:

248. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012) (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections
1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”).
249. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2161 (1999) (“Prior to Erie, federal and state courts alike
applied the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity on the domestic plane without authorization from
Congress or the Executive.”). See also The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 123 (1812)
(upholding the sovereign immunity of France under the law of nations).
250. See, e.g., United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(“There is no sign that Congress intended to reject the application of international law when it
enacted s 955a(a). Rather, the converse is true; the intent to abide by international law pervades
the legislative history of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act. Since Congress did not reject
application of the law of nations, the Court must determine whether the Indictment before it is
proper under the international law of jurisdiction.”).
251. U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII.
252. See Penn Law, supra note 145, at 28:20−30:00 (noting that it is difficult to determine what
would be unusual punishment without looking to other countries).
253. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005) (“In sum, it is fair to say that the United
States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”).

HOWARD ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

3/5/2020 10:26 PM

A REVISED REVISIONIST POSITION

95

[T]he United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional
constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than
a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws
permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age.254

Despite this reservation, two years later Congress explicitly
changed its stance when enacting the Federal Death Penalty Act,
stating “that no person may be sentenced to death who was less than
18 years of age at the time of the offense.”255 By changing this stance in
1994, Congress impliedly accepted the custom within the law of nations
that minors cannot be subject to capital punishment, even though a
number of states still permitted this practice. A little more than a
decade later, the Court in Roper v. Simmons explicitly decided the
Eighth Amendment requires this conclusion, prohibiting states from
imposing the death penalty on minors, and in doing so, the Court noted
the congressional change and looked to foreign jurisdictions in
determining that this practice constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.256
The second situation—where Congress has not acted one way or
the other—is the most disputed area of this debate. In the absence of
congressional authority or disapproval, the judiciary must look to other
identifiable authoritative sources of law—namely, the Constitution or,
in the case of modern CIL, the states. If the Constitution permits or
requires application of the law of nations, then the courts, depending
on the constitutional authorization, should or may incorporate the law
of nations. For example, while the U.S. has signed the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Senate never gave its advice or
consent,257 and “the United States considers many of the provisions of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary
international law on the law of treaties.”258 Even though the U.S. has

254. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (Apr. 2, 1992).
255. 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2012).
256. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567-68, 575-77.
257. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
258. Katherine M. Davis, I, Too, Sing America: Customary International Law for American
State and Federal Courts’ Post-Kiobel Jurisprudence, Guided by Australian and Indian
Experiences, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 119, 142 (2014) (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited
Sept. 24, 2013, 9:57 PM)).
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not adopted this treaty, courts rely upon it “as an authoritative guide to
the customary international law of treaties,” insofar as it reflects actual
state practices.259 The U.S. has accepted and rejected some of the
provisions within the treaty.260 Therefore, in accordance with Article III,
the courts would have to look to the Constitution in deciding whether
to apply the law of nations from the Vienna Convention.
Another much more recent example of this second situation is the
Paris Agreement. Congress has repeatedly adopted legislation and
decrees stating that climate change is a national security issue and
adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, an agreement that was ratified by the Senate and remains U.S.
law today.261 Before this, the U.S. has signed and ratified other treaties
relating to addressing climate change on an international level.262 Even
though the current administration has purportedly left the agreement,
the Paris Agreement has likely risen or will soon rise to the level of CIL,
as 178 of the 195 signatories have ratified the agreement.263 If the U.S.
is then sued in federal court for a violation of the Paris Agreement, the
courts will have to analyze this question under the framework: (1) has
Congress implicitly authorized this environmental regulatory custom
through its previous ratification of treaties and enactment of federal
statutes; and (2) if the courts find Congress has not acted one way or
the other on the Paris Agreements specifically (since the Agreement
has not yet been submitted to the legislature), has the Constitution
authorized incorporation of this CIL?
The third category—where the political branches have explicitly or
impliedly rejected the law of nations—is another generally
straightforward category. If Congress has expressly or impliedly
rejected the law of nations or enacted contrary laws or treaties within
that field, courts have held CIL has no place in federal law.264 In Paquete
259. Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n. 19 (2d Cir. 2008).
260. Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States
Court, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 301 (1988).
261. Michael Dobson, The Senate Story that Everyone is Missing, HUFF. POST (April 7, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-senate-story-that-everyone-is-missing_us_58e810a4e4
b06f8c18beebd5.
262. Id.
263. Environment, 7.d Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&lang=_en&clang=_en (last
accessed June 26, 2018).
264. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (holding that Congress may “shut
the door to the law of nations” either “explicitly, or implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy
the field”); Bradvica v. INS, 128 F.3d 1009, 1014 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ustomary international
law is not applicable in domestic courts where there is a controlling legislative act, such as the
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Habana,265 the Court stated, “[W]here there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .” And both
modern and revisionist scholars have agreed that Congress can enact
laws in contradiction to the law of nations. Based on this, courts have
determined that if there is congressional legislation or an executed
treaty, this overrides inconsistent CIL.266
If CIL can become federal law, would the law of nations as
incorporated preempt prior or subsequent federally-enacted law? If
there is a conflict between the law of nations and a congressionallyenacted statute, which reigns supreme? Most scholars and courts agree
that “a federal statute trumps a prior inconsistent norm of CIL—that
is, Congress can violate CIL.”267 Similarly, even the “modernist position
recognizes, of course, that customary international law may be
overridden by subsequent federal legislation.”268 And this conclusion
makes logical sense, as the domestic sovereigns have spoken on what
law applies within the nation—a positivist conclusion.
Positivism—the basis of U.S. law as described above—requires that
the law comes from an identifiable domestic sovereign. CIL does not
satisfy this requirement unless and until the domestic political branches
or the Constitution adopt or incorporate those norms into U.S. law. This
authorization can come from either explicit incorporation, such as
codification of those norms, or implicit, such as assenting to an

statute here.”).
265. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
266. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting refugee’s
customary international law claim because Congress’ “extensive legislative scheme for the
admission of refugees” governed it).
267. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 842; Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky.
385, 391 (1863) (“It must be conceded, however, that the courts of a sovereign engaged in war
cannot compel him to observe the usage of nations, nor treat as void any act of his because it
violates that usage. The law of nations has no obligatory force upon him in dealing with his
subjects. He may disregard it, and establish a different rule; and if he does so, those within his
jurisdiction must observe the rule so established, however it may conflict with the usage of
nations. In the absence of any positive law to the contrary, the usage of nations may furnish a rule
for the guidance of courts of justice; but they cannot be governed by it in the presence of a positive
conflicting law made by a sovereign who may choose to disregard it.”). See also Oliva v. United
States Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that “clear congressional
action trumps customary international law”).
268. Born, supra note 5, at 1649. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 81, at 384 (“Our system follows
a practice of presumptive enforceability of customary international law, subject to congressional
override.”); Koh, supra note 74, at 1835 (“Once customary norms have sufficiently crystallized,
courts should presumptively incorporate them into federal common law, unless the norms have
been ousted as law for the United States by contrary federal directives.”).
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international treaty or passing a resolution in favor or against a norm.269
Therefore, without authorization by our domestic sovereigns, courts
cannot apply either traditional or modern CIL within the U.S.
C. Should the Law of Nations be Domestic Law?
Now that we have discussed whether the law of nations (or part of
it) is federal law, the policy question arises whether this is a beneficial
conclusion. The theory in this Article means that much of CIL is not
domestic law. This would be so unless and until the political branches
incorporated CIL into federal law. But why should this be an
undesirable result? And is this conclusion really “radical,”270 to require
domestic law to be created by the domestic lawmakers? As described
in Section II, CIL is unwritten, variable, and changing. Additionally,
specific CIL norms are difficult to determine and sources are often
selectively chosen and cherry-picked among thousands of sources. To
have the law of nations automatically incorporated into federal law—
as the modernists would want—would be to introduce a constantly
changing variable into domestic law over which the nation and its
citizens have little to no control. “The fact that international jurists
cannot agree on what it takes to produce a rule of customary
international law is hardly comforting.”271 And unlike the modernists
claim that their position was the “hornbook” rule,272 the modern
scholars still cannot point to a single case that has adopted or applied
their conclusion.273
One specific example espoused by revisionists is the democratic
deficit that CIL incorporation brings, as the citizens of the United
States have no direct say in the representatives or laws of CIL.274
Essentially, the argument is that “if customary international law can be
made by practice wholly outside the United States it has no basis in
popular sovereignty at all. Some foreign governments are not

269. The allocation of power between Congress and the president to do so are beyond the
scope of this Article.
270. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 74, at 1828 (“For if customary international law is neither
federal nor state law (unless specifically incorporated by the state or federal political branches),
then in most cases, customary international law is not United States law at all!”).
271. Vázquez, supra note 61, at 1618.
272. Koh, supra note 74, at 1825.
273. Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 829–30.
274. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 857 (“In addition, the modern
position that CIL is federal common law is in tension with basic notions of American
representative democracy.”).
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responsive to their own people, let alone to the American people.”275
This is even more a concern in the context of modern CIL, as this
derives not from the practice of states but from the pronouncements of
the UN or international bodies, statements by states, and the writings
of scholars. These pronunciations of judges and scholars used to make
modern CIL are then based on democratically deficient foundations,
such as agreements between or including non-democratic nations.276
Even traditional CIL has its own democratic deficiencies, especially in
the interpretation of what constitutes a general practice of states.277
This is a valid concern of the revisionist scholars. How can a foreign
government—which has no required duty to American citizens and
which often has significantly different problems within their own
country—be directly responsive to or held responsible by citizens
within this country? Professor Gerald Neuman attempted to respond
to these critiques of democratic legitimacy by arguing that although the
process associated with the formation of customary international law
“is not direct democracy, it is a form of representative democracy”
because the political branches participate in this process.278
It is true that not all law within the United States is created by
elected representatives, and therefore, is like international law in that
aspect.279 But international law takes this another step further,
particularly that of modern CIL. The United States does not always
have a say in the evolution of international law, and with the increasing
use of modern CIL—which emanates not from the general practice of
states but also from other individual sources such as U.N.
declarations—it is becoming even farther from the U.S. people’s hands.
At the very least, democratic legitimacy requires full participation and
should require assent to a specific norm.280 Yet the law of nations
275. Trimble, supra note 3, at 721.
276. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 64, at 1204 (“The democracy deficit of modern
customary international law is not limited to the unrepresentative nature of those charged with
making crucial discretionary judgments. The sources that publicists and others rely upon to
“make” international law are themselves forged undemocratically.”).
277. See id. at 1207–08, 1247 (“The political branches should be able to incorporate
international law into domestic law through the ordinary legislative processes that ensure
democratic control over lawmaking. But raw international law should not be allowed to become
part of our law.”).
278. Neuman, supra note 81, at 383–84. See also Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra
note 5, at 742.
279. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 103 (2006).
280. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449,
523 (2000) (The methodologies actually used to determine CIL cannot support the democratic
legitimacy of its norms.”).
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requires neither, particularly modern CIL, creating this democratic
deficit in the application of CIL to federal law. Requiring the automatic
incorporation of an “international common law” into domestic law by
way of a restricted federal common law undermines the very
foundation of the U.S. legal system. Policy further dictates that CIL
should not be automatically incorporated as this would weaken the
domestic legal system and introduce incredible uncertainty into our
law.
D. Professors Bellia and Clark Are Fundamentally Revisionists
In one of the more recent positions, Professors Bellia and Clark’s
articles—and now a rather convincing book—craft an extensive look
into the interpretation of the Constitution in relation to the law of
nations.281 Rather than rejecting the revisionist position, this Author
believes their ideas contribute more to an evolution of the revisionists’
fundamental conclusion to the second question posed at the beginning
of this Article—how is CIL incorporated into federal law, or is it at
all?282 Unlike many assertions, the revisionist position never held that
the law of nations was exclusively state law; that was the (incorrect)
interpretation by modern scholars after Bradley and Goldsmith’s
initial article.283 Rather, the revisionists simply conclude that CIL is not
federal law unless authorized for judicial application by the political
branches—our domestic authority. Just because the law of nations is
not initially federal law does not automatically make it state law.
On the second issue described in this Article—that CIL is only
domestic law if adopted by the political branches—Bellia and Clark’s
conclusions stem from the same foundation as the revisionists’
positions. Both schools of thought view domestic law as requiring some
domestic source of authority to authorize application of CIL, whether
it be the Constitution or federal statute. Bellia and Clark are correct in
their statement that “the Constitution is a fundamental source of
domestic law in the United States, and therefore U.S. courts not only
may, but must, apply principles of the law of nations when the
281. See generally Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5 (discussing their view of
the law of nations debate); BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 9 (same).
282. See Vázquez, supra note 61, at 1597–98 (2011) (showing some of the similarities and
differences between the Bellia & Clark position with the revisionist position).
283. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Incorporation, supra note 94, at 2261 (“[W]e have not in fact
argued that CIL is state law. Rather, as Koh at times acknowledges, our view is that CIL should
not be a source of law for courts in the United States unless the appropriate sovereign—the
federal political branches or the appropriate state entity—makes it so.”).
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Constitution requires them to do so.”284 The Constitution is the
fundamental positivist source of law in the United States,285 and if the
law of nations is required to interpret a provision, then it must be
applied. This is in line with the revisionists’ basic tenet that there must
be a domestic source for the authorization of the law of nations. The
Constitution can be that source of domestic authority. Therefore, even
though Bellia and Clark attempt to distinguish themselves from
revisionists, their fundamental theory appears to be quite similar to the
revisionists’ elementary conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The law of nations is not domestic law unless there is domestic
authorization. This can be done either implicitly or explicitly, but it
must be done before the courts can apply CIL as U.S. law. However, the
question posed at the very beginning of this Article may not be
decisively resolved by the Supreme Court anytime soon, and this
debate may continue for years to come. The last three Supreme Court
decisions in the past 15 years that touched on this topic only sparked
more controversy, and Jesner did little to resolve the debate. Yet some
of the Justices have begun to acknowledge the ensuing debate,286 along
with many lower courts.287 A few of the lower courts have been taking
sides, with much of the en banc D.C. Circuit adopting the revisionist
positions.288 As international law and the modern law of nations
become more prominent and frequent in federal courts, this issue will
arise more frequently.

284. Bellia & Clark, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 832.
285. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
286. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(referencing multiple law review articles on this law of nations debate); see also Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1416 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (same).
287. See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 376 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We take no position on the
question of the role of federal courts to apply customary international law as federal law in other
contexts, a subject of recent lively academic debate.”); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d
233, 245 n.19 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing several law review articles in this law of nations debate, stating
“[a]mong legal commentators, Filartiga’s interpretation of the ATCA has attracted both
celebrants and critics”); Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1153 n.4 (7th Cir.
2001) (“In light of the present uncertainty about the precise domestic role of customary
international law, the statement that international law is part of our law provides limited support
for the proposed application of Charming Betsy.”).
288. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, Ginsburg,
Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland, and Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc) (“[I]nternational norms outside of those explicitly incorporated into our domestic law by
the political branches are not part of the fabric of the law enforceable by federal courts after
Erie.”).
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As stated in the introduction, this Article concludes that: (1) the
traditional law of nations is exclusively within federal law, while the
modern CIL can be adopted by either the federal or state domestic
authorities; and (2) the law of nations only becomes federal law if either
(a) the Constitution permits or requires the law of nations in
interpretation of its provisions, or (b) the political branches adopt a
certain custom or authorize the judiciary to decide questions regarding
the law of nations. While a “revised” position to the revisionist
foundation is presented in this Article, it too presents an evolution of
those fundamental revisionist conclusions: that the law of nations is not
domestic law unless authorized by domestic sources.

